– Welcome everyone. And I’d like to thank all of
you for coming this afternoon. I’m Shaun Casey, Director of the Berkeley
Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs here
at Georgetown University. On behalf of my colleagues at the Center, as well as our colleagues in
the office of the President who helped make this event possible, I want to welcome you all to
our conversation this evening. In a moment, President DeGioia
will welcome our speaker, and it’s a good idea he’s
doing that instead of me, because I would go on
and on and on for hours, but I will spare you that indignity. But I just want to offer
some brief background on the Berkeley Lecture Series. Begun in 2007, the Berkeley Center
Lecture is an annual series that brings distinguished speakers to campus for presentations on topics at the intersection of religion, culture and politics. Public intellectuals
from around the globe, including Charles Taylor, Hans Yohass, Juergen Habermas, Tu Way Ming, Martha Nussbaum and Madeline Albright, have delivered the Berkeley Center Lecture over the past decade discussing issues ranging from theoretical and philosophical questions at the intersection of religion and society. To the very practical implications of religion in the global
politics and policy. Today, we look forward to
Father Bryan here being added to this list of distinguished
scholars and thinkers who’ve offered the
Berkeley Center Lecture. And now I’ll invite President DeGioia to introduce Father Hehir in
the subject of today’s lecture. Thank you again for coming. – Thanks very much. – Thanks Jim. (audience applauds) – Well thank you very much Shaun. Thank you for your exceptional leadership of our Berkeley Center. It’s a pleasure to be with all of you as we gather for the 2019
Berkeley Center Lecture. Again, I’d like to thank Shaun and all of his colleagues
in our Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs for their leadership and
organizing our convening. I’d like to take a
special moment to express a word of welcome to
Congressman Francis Rooney, who prior to his service in
the House of Representatives, Congressmen Rooney served as United States ambassador
to the OEC from 2005 to 2008. We’re grateful that you could
join us for this dialogue. Today’s lecture offers us
an opportunity to engage the expertise of an
extraordinary scholar of ethics, international relations
and the role of the church. And there’s perhaps no one
better to speak to this topic than our guest today, Father Bryan Hehir, as he offers us his
reflections and insights on Vatican diplomacy
across three pontificates, each representing pivotal
moments in the past century and the significance of this moment in how we might best understand Vatican approaches to diplomacy today. Father Hehir has demonstrated
throughout his life and in his scholarship, a deep commitment to being in his words, “At the intersection of
the church’s teaching role “and its social ministry
in the public arena “of American society.” Father Hehir has always
worked at this intersection of the church and its work
and health care and education, and in the social ministry. He currently serves on the faculty at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, where he is the Parker Gilbert
Montgomery Professor of the Practice of Religion and Public Life. He’s a dioceses priest of Boston, currently the Cabinet
Secretary for Social Services in the Archdioceses of Boston. He was ordained a priest in 1966, he worked for many years with the US Council of Catholic Bishops, and many of you would remember
that he was the lead author of the 1983 pastoral
letter on nuclear weapons entitled “The Challenge of Peace, “God’s Promise and our Response”. He was a member of our faculty here at Georgetown for many years, he held the Joseph P. Kennedy
Chair in Christian Ethics at our Kennedy Institute of Ethics. Was a research professor at
our School of Foreign Service, in full disclosure, I was
a student of Father Harris. He served on my dissertation committee and I’m forever grateful for every minute that I ever had the
opportunity to spend with him. Also grateful for his service on our university’s board of directors, two different tours, and also as a member of the board of advisors for the
School of Foreign Service. In addition to his current role at Harvard as part of the Kennedy School he also has served on the faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, where he was also the
Dean from 1998 to 2001. My recollection Bryan, is you didn’t actually have that title, but there’s a long story
to that, and I won’t. (laughs) But he was also President and
CEO of Catholic Charities USA from 2001 to 2003, before
returning to Boston. He was in 1984 MacArthur Fellow in one of the earliest
of the MacArthur Fellows, and has I think in many of our lives emerged to provide a talk, perhaps like the one today, where he enabled us to see
with a depth and a clarity a set of challenges that we were trying to make sense of in our own lives. He provided a clarity and coherence that previously was unavailable to us. So I’d like to again express our gratitude to father Bryan Hehir, a wonderful friend and colleague. It’s a privilege to
have him back to present the 2019 Berkeley Center Lecture. Father Bryan Hehir. (audience applauds) – Well good afternoon, good afternoon. First let me express
thanks for the invitation to give the Berkeley Lecture. Thanks first to President DeGioia for his as always generous introduction. Secondly, thanks to Shaun Casey the Director of the Berkeley Center, and thanks to the University as a whole. Now, I would have been happy to have Shaun go on for
hours and hours about me, until he read the list of
the previous lecturers. So I hear this list of previous lecturers. I look out, I’ve got John O’Malley, I’ve got Gerry Fogerty, I’ve got David Hollenbeck, and I’m gonna dive into three
pontificates in 45 minutes, and I’ve got the fear of
God in me, I’ll tell you. That’s exactly the status that I have. So I will get on quickly
two what I’m going to do. Returning to Georgetown is always a privilege and a pleasure. And so once again, I appreciate the opportunity
to be here this afternoon. My topic, Vatican diplomacy,
has a long history. The classical names begin
with Pope Gelasius in 496, move on through two
Gregory’s who died in 603, and then 1085. Move onto the post Westphalian Order of International Relations, and up through the 20th-century papacy. Now you will all be glad that I will not try to summarize that. My objective is more modest in scope. So what is to provide
an analytical snapshot, and I stress snapshot of three papacy’s. Pius XII from 1939 to 1958. John Paul II from 1978 to 2005, and Pope Francis since 2013. Even with that reduction in scope, I need to acknowledge that the
history of Vatican diplomacy is not constricted to the papacy. And there would be other candidates that could be analyzed through
the eyes of their papacy’s. But to get to what I will propose to do, I want to begin with a couple of preliminary substantive remarks, and then move directly
onto the three popes. Looking at their background, the international system
that they encountered, and then the character of their diplomacy. First, preliminary remarks. Vatican diplomacy and
diplomacy in general. The question here is can the Vatican’s role in policy be studied within the framework of
contemporary understandings of the theory of world politics and the analysis of
foreign policy of state. Jack Schneider of Colombia in his book, “Religion and International
Relations Theory”, grapples with this question. But he begins this grappling with the observation that, and I quote, “The main canonical works “of international relations theory “hardly mentions religion.” The fit, it seems to me and
to him, is difficult to make. But I wouldn’t give up on
trying to make the fit. My sense is that there is
an analogical relationship between Vatican diplomacy
and secular diplomacy. We all remember analogy means two things that are somewhat the same, and yet totally different. And that’s the way I would
describe this relationship. If you look at major schools
like realism and liberalism, they are not easily translatable into analysis of Vatican foreign policy. But there’s always been
a realist streak in the Catholic teaching on
international relations. Illustrated always by the premises of the just war doctrine for example. And if one looks at the
purposes of liberal statecraft, the emphasis on values in
international relations and on trans-nationality as the character of world politics, along with sovereign
states all of that leads me to say that there can be useful overlap in the study of Vatican diplomacy and what we get in international relations schools of thought. Second substantive question. The topic here might be
called what moves history. The question is what is really the moving force in large
historical questions. In the nineteenth century, and continuing into the beginning
of the twentieth century, the dominant force was what might be called the great
person theory of history. That is to say, history is
made up of grand figures who introduced major
policies and shape the world. As the 20th-century
proceeded in social science, the emphasis shifted away
from the great person theory, to the argument that broad
secular historical forces were the driving force in history. However one stands on that large debate, it does seem to me that if you’re studying Vatican diplomacy, you have to give pretty large space to the great person theory, just because the nature
of Vatican foreign policy. Finally, the focus of my remarks is focusing on what might be called the foreign policy of the
Roman Catholic Church, the Vatican and the Holy See. But each of the popes are examined had significant engagement obviously internally in the life of the church. Pius XII, the author of major and cyclical ecclesiology
biblical studies and liturgy. John Paul II, the basic
theme of his papacy was the interpretation of Vatican II, meaning that he sought to provide an authoritative
interpretation, and a critique of other interpretations. And Pope Francis has introduced
a host of internal changes, in pastoral care and the administrative
structure of the church that continues on in his papacy. Now their internal policies therefore could be looked upon as
their principle in a sense impact on the church and the world. And to some degree things
slip from internal to external more or less, depending on
the person you’re studying. So let me turn now to my three models. I don’t use model in the
terms that economists use it, hard data, structured clear-cut lines. Model in this kind of
thing is more general. I would argue these are three voices addressing
Vatican diplomacy in each of their pontificates. And I would summarize it this way, with Pius XII you get the Pope as a lawyer and diplomat. With John Paul II you get the Pope as philosopher and statesman. And with Francis, you get the
Pope as pastor and profit. Here I’m trying to examine the
relationship of personality and holder of an office. And the style of the papacy in each case. So let me turn first to Pius XII, the Pope as lawyer and diplomat. In terms of background, he was a member of an
ancient Roman family, sometimes called the black
aristocracy to which they belong, those Catholics that
stayed faithful to the Pope at the time of the resurgamento. They were deeply connected to the papacy over two generations and served as lawyers for the papacy. They were deeply traditional
and pious families, and Pacelli himself had
a strong sense of being a member of that Roman family tradition. When he was ordained a priest
and he signed his name, it was Eugenio Pacelli, Roman, and Roman meant classical
Rome and religious Rome. His movement from childhood
into the priestly ministry was not exactly pursued by ordinary steps. The path to the papacy of course can never be predicted entirely. But Pacelli’s life when you look at it had a flavor of destiny about it. Thinking of his past from
the priesthood to the papacy, I was reminded of Henry
Kissinger’s comment about Lord Salisbury, the
19th-century British diplomat. Kissinger said of Salisbury,
“Salisbury’s rise in politics “was as effortless as
it was fore-ordained.” Now getting to the papacy has other things involved
with the Holy Spirit, that didn’t necessarily take place in Salisbury’s effortless
rise in politics. So again, it’s an
analogy, not an identity. His path to ordination and
then to early assignment was hardly ordinary. He studied law and then
decided to enter the seminary, but because of poor health he
was allowed to live at home. His first and only pastoral assignment was two years in his home parish. And he had been mentored from
early on by Cardinal Gasparri. And so Pius XII entered
the diplomatic service of the papacy and the rest was history. No more pastoral assignments, no more deviation from a
path that moved rapidly through multiple assignments. One could summarize those assignments, or stages of his career in three steps. From 1917 to 29 he was Nuncio
in Bavaria and Germany. From 1930 to 39 he was
Secretary of State to Pius XI, and from 1939 to 1958 he was in the chair of
Peter as Pope of the church. Now if you look at
those three assignments, they also bear upon
his conduct and policy. In the interwar period,
Pacelli was in Germany. I think it could be said
without strong criticism that in principle he opposed the three dominant
ideologies of the decade. Fascism, Nazism and communism. But from the beginning,
and throughout his career he saw communism as the
principal effect to the church. Beyond that inclination Pacelli was also shaped by Gasparri’s influence, who did not like
confrontation with states, he always sought
accommodation within limits, and Pius XII took that approach. That brought him into
conflict with Pius XI, he was inclined to conflict
on more than one occasion. So the tradition of Pius XI was that during the 1930’s when in France there was the inter-grist movement, which became so severe in its conservatism of politics and theology
that a cardinal’s hat was removed in the midst of it. And it came to pass that one
rector of the seminary in Rome from the Holy Ghost Fathers, was also involved in the
inter-grist movement. So Pius XII called the head of the Holy Ghost Fathers
in to talk about this, and the man was an elderly
man with a long beard. Pius XII said, “Fire the rector.” The Holy Ghost Superior
said, “Your Holiness, “I’ll do the best I can.” To which Pius XI grabbed
him by the beard and said, “I didn’t ask you to
do the best you could, “fire the rector.” So if you had an accommodationist approach you might enter into some
conflict with Pius XI. Pius XII upon taking
the office of the papacy then began his career in 1939 as the Pope. Now, anybody who talks about Pius XII in this period of time has a
huge challenge facing them. And that of course is the
question of Pius XII’s attitude toward anti-Semitism
and toward the Holocaust. Father John Langdon
wrote a really fine piece on Pius XII’s social
teaching some years ago, and began the article by
saying anybody who looks at this question must have
to do the following things. Search through mounds of archival data, secondly, define the position from which you are coming to judge. And thirdly, overcome the sense of secrecy that surrounds the whole affair. Whereupon John said, “I’m
not prepared to do that.” And went on to write a great article. I’m not prepared to do it either, and so you will just have to excuse me, at least until we have the reception when I will speak without. So let me turn from not doing that to the actual posture of
Pius XII during the war. He followed the example of Benedict XV, who was pope from 1914 to 1922. Both of them maintained a posture of what was called impartiality, or sometimes neutrality, in conflicts between states when Catholics were on
both sides of the conflict. The rationale in both
cases, Benedict and Pius was a pastoral one. Care for the Catholics involved. It was always open to vigorous critique, and that critique was
intensified in World War II far more than in World War I. As John Langdon makes the point, it became increasingly difficult to sustain this traditional posture, because in World War II you
clearly had on the one hand, genocide being carried out, and on the other hand,
genocide being suffered. And so the neutrality policy, while it was followed during the war, did not escape severe critique, and that would then tie into, eventually tie into Pius
XII and the Holocaust. In the post-war order, the second stage of
Pius XII’s pontificate, he faced what became known
in the international system as the bipolar nuclear order, the superpowers in global confrontation armed with weapons unimagined
in previous history. Moreover, what happened after World War II is the whole focus of
world politics shifted from the center of Europe to the United States and the Soviet Union. Now, the significance of that was that Pius XII himself
was dedicated to the idea of rebuilding Europe, creating a single community in Europe With a united Germany at its center. This policy of Pius XII
met severe obstacles. First, from the beginning Pius XII advocated what he called
a peace of reconciliation, not a punitive peace
toward Germany and Italy. This general posture of
peace of reconciliation, contained an argument
against collective guilt being imposed on the German
population as a whole. It also involved a strong advocacy for a program of reconstruction
of the devastated Europe, particularly humanitarian rationale and deterrents of future
chaos in the European theater. Pius XII and US policy
was a complicated mix. Pius XII proposed unconditional surrender, which was US policy. He opposed the division of
Germany, which became US policy. He opposed the punitive peace, and yet he recognized
that for other goals, like the reconstruction of Europe, that it was necessary to
cooperate with the United States. The collaboration of the Vatican and the US government as
I say, was not simple. Franklin Roosevelt wanted
to treat the Soviet Union at the beginning as a partner in victory. Pius XII early on began to
warn against this policy. The acceptance of the altar agreement, and then beyond that to
the policy of containment shaped by George Cannon, and ultimately followed
by the United States, was the policy that ran head on from Pius XII’s position
to his plan for Europe. A united Germany, a Europe
across the continent, both were being undercut by
the altar and containment. By the late 1940’s and early fifties, US policy toward the Soviet Union shifted into a more direct
policy of opposition, and in that sense Pius XII had advocated that position earlier. Finally, Pius XII’s attitude toward the UN is interesting. After World War I, the
Holy See was very critical, highly critical and non-supportive
of the League of Nations. Pius XII, quickly married in a sense, the church to the United Nations, while he had his reservations he on the whole was supportive, and that support has only
grown throughout the decades since the founding of the UN. Now, Pius XII’s view of communism was that it was a threefold problem. It was first that the Soviet Union was right in the middle of Europe already, right where he wanted a united Germany. Secondly, there was the
role of Communist parties, particularly in Germany and Italy in the elections in the post-war period. And thirdly, there was the opposition of the
Russian Orthodox Church. Faced with that, Pius XII mobilized Catholic
posture versus communism, and he engaged rather successfully American Catholics in that policy. The bishop’s conference, published statements that were in line with his approach to the problem. And there was a stream of
Americans appointed to the Coria to solidify the link
between Rome and Washington. At one point there were
arguments that Cardinal Spelman might become the Secretary of State, but Pius XII in the end decided to be his own Secretary of State, so that’s settled that question. Pius XII mobilized a catholic position against communism. He worked with Christian
Democratic parties, but worked is a strange verb here. He really wanted to direct them, and neither Gasparri or
Eidenau would have any of that, the age of the laity had arrived. And then finally, Pius
XII did instruct Catholics in Eastern Europe not to cooperate with the communist regime. The difficulty with that is
that those local churches were so frail they had to cooperate to a certain degree in order to survive. So without being complete
in any sense of the term, what can one finally say about the policy? Well, it was a Eurocentric focus, it was a policy that met
some degree of opposition, and some differences of strategy with his immediate partners, whether the Christian Democrats or the US, and his instruction of non-cooperation was followed very selectively. Cardinal Vochinsky for example, always ran his own show up
to and after Vatican II, when he met with Paul VI to talk about Vatican Council and he said to him, “You will understand “that I understand Poland
better than you do.” And then he left. And so that was pretty
much the background. So at the moment, I have to leave the description where it is. Let me turn to John Paul II, the Pope as philosopher and statesman. His background couldn’t
have been substantially more different than Pius XII. His family was filled with tragedy, his mother died when he was
young, his brother died. He was raised by his father. His life cut across three wars of course. He embodied the history of the twentieth century in his own life. World War I, his father was a participant. World War II of course, he
was in hiding from the Nazis. And then the Cold War
was his life of ministry up until 1989. He had an extraordinary
range of abilities. He was a laborer, an actor, a poet, and an underground seminarian. Pius XII was at home, he was underground. Now, one doesn’t want to
make too much of that, but it’s just a symbolic
sense of the difference. When he began the study
for the priesthood. It was as an underground seminarian in the house of the Cardinal
Archbishop of Graco. Early on, his academic
ability was recognized, and so he pursued immediately
two doctorate degrees, one in philosophy and the other in theology and spirituality. He was a university chaplain and formed strong views of how
to cooperate with laypeople. And then we come to
the point in his career of the second Vatican Council. To some degree he was
prepared for the council, as an academic prior to the council, he was familiar with the
currents of theology in Europe. As Bishop and Pope, he had a capacious perception of ministry, and that was always
guided by the objective of trying to implement Vatican
II as he understood it. But in terms of the council itself, he brought with him his experience
as a priest and a bishop, working under an atheistic regime, working in a profoundly Christian country. He lived in a centralized command economy. And that economy and that life existed with a vibrant intellectual culture. The culture, the economy, the regime, a complex background. The Council for him was a pivotal point, he made distinctive
contributions to two key texts. The declaration of religious freedom, and the document Gaudium et spes, the church and the modern world. Immediately after the council, he implemented a large-scale program implementing the council in Krakow. The international system
that he faced as a bishop and then as Pope was the
Cold War in full run. All agreed that the Cold
War was bipolar and nuclear. He lived with that up until the time that with his cooperation
that order was eroded and essentially overthrown. He then lived with the
post-Cold War order. If you look at the writings of international relations
theorists and advocates, everybody agreed what was gone, it was no longer the Cold War. There wasn’t unanimity about
what had taken its place. And then in addition to the
post-Cold War order of course, you had September 9/11 2001, transnational terrorism was overlaid over the post Cold War order. The council as I say, was pivotal for him. Now why do I say that? Because I think he
shaped a view of ministry which then carried over
into his diplomacy. And that view of ministry was shaped by two different contributions
that he wove together in his ministry in Poland,
and then in the papacy. The first contribution
was from Gaudium et spes, the last and longest
document of the council. As you know, that document
was a rather stunning shift from what had prevailed in the churches addressed to modernity
and the modern world. From the mid-19th-century certainly up until the mid-20th century. I think Pius XII himself is a kind of transitional figure, he reflects the earlier period, and he began to change
it at the same time. And so Gaudium et spes was
a different approach to the nature of the world. Pius XII was a person schooled in the tone and
themes of Gaudium et spes. The engagement with
the world by the church as you find in this document is an engagement marked by what I would call confident modesty. On the one hand there is the sense that the church has something
to say to the modern world, on the other hand there
is a real clear sense that we have much to learn
from the modern world. What Pius XII took from
that document I think in his shaping of his ministry, what a section that John Courtney
Murray himself focused on. Paragraphs 40 to 42 of Gaudium et spes. What those paragraphs
said were the following. First, the church has no
particular political chrism, it has no grace to make
political decisions. Secondly, it does have a
religiously-based ministry which should produce the
following secular results. It should contribute to the protection of the
dignity of the person, to the promotion of human rights, to the provision of a sense of meaning in every area of life, and to the fostering of the
unity of the human family. So a religiously-based ministry should be able to produce that kind of collaboration with the world. I think John Paul II took
that conception of ministry, if you look at what happened in Poland, it seems to me it’s a religiously-based
ministry of resistance. But then it expresses itself in terms of the second component of John Paul II’s view of ministry, and that’s a humans rights
ministry in the church. So there he builds on Pacem in terris, so think of the Council on the one hand and Pacem in terris on the other hand, put them together into a style of ministry that shaped his view of episcopacy, his role in Poland, and carried on into the Ministry of the papacy. In a way that I can’t fully explain here, because time and other reasons, but maybe because I can’t
fully synthesize it, John Paul II not only
inherited these things, he moved them forward in his own thought. And the best example of that
is the human rights question. Think of human rights this way. Pius XII did open the door to developments in Catholicism, often times he opened the door, but he didn’t walk through it. That’s exactly what he
did on religious freedom, as John Courtney Murray said, he changed the state of the question But he never walked through the door. He did that on more than one
thing, including human rights. In the Christmas addresses he opens the question of human rights, and when John XXIII
writes Pacem in terris, half of the footnotes in Pacem in terris are Pius XII’s. And so he opened the door on human rights, he opened the door carefully on democracy and the church. And both of those things, plus the religious liberty to mention were all things that he stepped forward but didn’t step across the threshold. John Paul II took the
human rights teaching from Pius XII and then
from Pacem in terris and pressed it forward
in two UN addresses. His first address, which
focused on the rights of a person as a structuring idea
and measurement of society. And then the second much less well-known, and I think not well attended to was his UN address of 1995 where he talked about
the rights of nations as well as the rights of persons. And in that he has some very
interesting things to say about what I would call
a legitimate nationalism and illegitimate patriotism. Things that would be very
interesting to think about today when we have illegitimate nationalism and patriotism without limits. So he moved the discussion
forward as well as inheriting it. But as I said, I can’t really
elaborate on those two. But let me turn to the
character of his diplomacy, when you describe the
character of his diplomacy one begins I think with what I’ll call the primacy of Poland. This Pope from the second world, this Pope from the church of silence now was ready to speak
to the world as a whole. One of his biographers, Ted Zolt, before he wrote the biography, had an article in “The New Republic” at that time John Paul II
was elected to the papacy, and this is what he said, “By electing Poland’s Karol
Wojtyla to the papacy, “the Roman Catholic Church
has thrust world politics “into a wholly new dimension “with extraordinary and
far reaching consequences “that can be fully measured
only with the passage of time. “The elevation of the 58
year old Polish prelate “to the Holy See as Pope John Paul II “constitutes a global
event of vast proportions.” The primacy of Poland. He had to address Poland first for the following reasons. First of all because of
what was happening in Poland shortly after he was named to the papacy. And that was the union
movement in a new phase, led by Wojtyla. Secondly, because of the
danger of that moment, the difficulty of how do you
confront a totalitarian state without provoking from them catastrophe. The memory of Hungary in 1956, and a bit less catastrophic
but no less serious, Czechoslovakia in 68. So how could you carry off this religiously-based resistance, but not provoke a devastating response? So he had to do it because of the intrinsic significance
of what was happening, he had to do it because of
the danger that was there. And thirdly, he had to do it because he had been prepared
for this since ordination. As I say, a sense of destiny. From Rome he became the
philosopher of the resistance, the advocate for Poles, and when it came down to it
in the most dangerous moment, the strategist guiding what
happened inside Poland. Now the consequences of the overturning of the
regime in Poland of course hard electrical,
electrifying consequences. It spread from Poland immediately across most of Eastern Europe, and then of course to
the Soviet Union itself. Now, I’m not making a
uni-causal argument here, which sometimes does get
made, and I think is wrong. If you had Stalin rather
than Gorbachev in office, the person again, not just the grand force it could have been a
whole different thing. So arguments about uni-causality here, Stanley Hoffman once told me there were no uni-causal arguments, and so I believe him. So I’ll use it here, it
didn’t work that way. However, we have to listen to Gorbachev’s epitaph if you will. He said, “What happened in
Eastern Europe in recent years “would not have been possible without “the presence of this Pope.” So you don’t have to argue in a uni-causal way to give him credit. The consequences of Poland were not simply what happened politically in Eastern Europe and to communism, it also vaulted John Paul II onto the world stage even more so, even more centrally than
had existed previously. It also brought into focus
for international relations the question of the role of
religion in world politics. Again Jack Snyder, now this was only one
piece of a larger picture. The next step you take it seems to me is John Paul II beyond Poland
and beyond the Cold War. John Paul II’s comment after the collapse of the Soviet Union, shortly after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, he was taking a trip to Africa and while everybody else wanted to talk to him about
Poland and Eastern Europe, his comment on the plane was, “The world cannot forget this place.” Meaning Africa, which of course was one of the dangers that one no longer was the
Cold War across the globe. Then there would be a disengagement of states from any
relationship with territory. But for John Paul II, this step was his step beyond
Poland and to the Cold War. He was ready to move onto a
more aggressive global papacy. It had been global previously, but it took on new dimensions. And this is reflected I
think in two documents. The encyclical Sollicitudo
rei socialis in 1987, and then Centesimus Annus in 1991. If you take those two documents together, it is an interesting mix. Sollicitudo rei socialis is a document that gets swallowed up by history, it’s the last commentary on the Cold War world by John Paul II. But it appeared so close
to the actual overthrow of the Cold War that people
don’t pay attention to it. But he did pay attention to it, and when he wrote
Centesimus Annus in 1981, which was his reflection Post the Cold War he pointed back to this. What’s interesting about
Sollicitudo rei socialis is that it in a sense blames equally the two superpowers for
the state of the world. He calls it the logic of the blocks, the logic of the blocks that he said impeded the
development of others in the international system. Then when he turns to Centesimus Annus, it isn’t so much a critique of the past, but it is positioning himself among different political
and economic systems and does a running commentary of what the future could be and should be. Here he tries to answer
specific questions, like does the collapse of real socialism leave only capitalism as the only outcome. And he said, “You have to
distinguish the question. “Tell me what kind of capitalism you mean? “Limited, “framed by other institutions in society, “or simply let run free. “If it’s the first,
I’m willing to say yes. “If it’s the second, it’s decidedly not.” And then he carries on
in Centesimus Annus with a social tradition of the church talking about different philosophies, the role of the state,
private property, et cetera. He then combines that of course with the trips that he makes. So again, retrospectively, when you look at these three Popes one of the things that
one has to recognize is that Pius XII of course
never traveled effectively, certainly outside Italy. But travel was to the Summer Palace, but not any more. You had these other two who
had enormous interaction between what they taught and
what they did on these trips. You think of his several
trips to Latin America, which produced then a dialogue
about social teaching, liberation theology, et cetera. Produced also the historic
visit to Cuba by him. You think about his
relationship to Europe, where he had this sense, not so much of Pius XII’s view of Europe, but he had a sense of a unified Europe. All during the Cold War it was fascinating that there were two
people who were in favor of a Europe from the
Atlantic to the Urals. General de Gaulle and John Paul II, they together thought
about Europe that way. Gorbachev eventually talked
about a common European home, but that had a different tone to it. But again, the trips in and out of Europe. And then thirdly, without
ever getting into it, is the Middle East and
how he dealt with it both politically, and how he changed parts of Catholic posture toward the Middle East with the diplomatic recognition of Israel. Let me turn now, because
I’m looking at my time. I got you. Let me turn to Francis, Pope Francis. Here the Pope as a pastor and profit. So an Argentinian of a
family of immigrants. From the first time I was ever asked to give a talk on Pope Francis, I was paired on the panel, not on the panel but on the
program with John O’Malley, always a risky thing to get into that. But my view then was, and I found other people
have said the same thing, so I guess it wasn’t original with me. But from the first talk on I felt there have been three basic influences that shape Francis. First, he’s a Jesuit. Secondly, he’s a Latin American bishop. And thirdly, he’s a post-conciliar bishop. Each one of those
contributes in its own way. The Jesuit training and experience I think comes through again and again. When in Evangelii gaudium
he says rather than say I’m gonna analyze the world, he said, “We gotta discern
what’s going on in the world.” That’s not a term that used
in social science very often, it’s a different kind
of look and analysis. I talk about him as a
Latin American bishop, not just an Argentina, because he incorporates
that whole experience from Medellin on up to
the end of the Cold War. And just as Poland shaped John Paul II, so this man is obviously shaped
from where he has come from. It’s not determinative,
but it’s influential. And he’s the post-conciliar bishop, committed to stronger episcopal conferences and collegiality. His road to ministry was not
the normal road for the papacy, he was a teacher, then a provincial, then a bishop and a cardinal. Not the classical mode
of the papal journey, which usually was diplomatic, except for John Paul II. But John Paul II had extensive
diplomatic experience in dealing with the Polish government, so this really was out of ordinary. Indeed, I think one of the
best pieces written on Francis, and I still think it is, was the piece that was written early on by actually a woman who is a colleague at Kennedy school now, Nancy Gibbs. Nancy Gibbs was editor of “Time” magazine, she wrote more editorials
for “Time” magazine on the person of the year than anybody else in the
history of “Time” magazine. This is what she said about Francis as they named him person of the year. In his nine months in office, he has placed himself
at the very center of the central conversations of our time about wealth and poverty, fairness and justice. Transparency, modernity, globalization, the role of women, the nature of marriage and the temptations of power. He captured the world by
his personality and style. Now, one has to think
about this in perspective. John Paul II had captured
the world with a funeral unlike any funeral in
the twentieth century. So could the church do it twice? Could it produce different
kinds of personalities that had a compelling kind of impact on the public as a whole? This man had that
compelling point of impact. At the same time, I have always felt that if you stay too long on that point, you really miss the point. And so I would distinguish Francis’s persona as Gibbs describes it, and you could take
other descriptions of it that would be similarly complementary. But I would distinguish
between the persona of Francis and the Francis project. For the Francis project I
believe is not personal, rather he seeks to shape
a practical ecclesiology. Practical ecclesiology. This is not Karl Renner
thinking about the church, this is coming from a different angle. And what he seeks to shape
is a practical ecclesiology, meaning a church capable
of addressing the world. The Gaudium et spes world, and to some degree the
non-Gaudium et spes world, because for all its strengths, Gaudium et spes reflected the North, rather than the south. And so he was interested in both. Like John Paul II, he sought
to implement the council, and he also sees himself in continuity with Catholic social teaching. When he is criticized for things he says, he always says I am quoting others, or at least reflecting others. His view of the church in the world is not as defined as Gaudium
et spes for John Paul II, but his interest is the
face of the church today. His argument that the church should be a field house hospital in a
combat zone, a house of mercy. Francis’s goal in my view is this, it’s justice in the world
and mercy in the church. And Gibbs again has a comment, so when she names the
person of the year she says, “For pulling the papacy out of “the palace and into the streets. “For committing the world’s largest church “to confronting its deepest needs. “And for balancing judgment with mercy, “Pope Francis is Time
2015 Man of the Year.” His view of the church as a
field hospital, et cetera, could be applied inside the church to debates that we have, I think it applies more
broadly to the world. It’s focused on what you
might call the edges of life, the edge of the circle of life,
what he calls the periphery. The goal was not to leave the rest of the church
or the world behind, but to connect the edge with the center. An interesting idea. Think of our own country in terms of connecting the edge and the center, whether that’s economically,
politically or socially. The way he carried out
his character of diplomacy was to choose four transnational
issues to concentrate on. Now, trans-nationality since the middle of the last century has become a significant
component part of world politics. It is clearly still a world of states, and it would beef I think
foolish to think not. But trans-nationality
has surfaced in two ways. Transnational problems
and transnational actors. Transnational problems are
issues that are of such a nature that no single nation,
no matter how powerful, can in a sense resolve them for itself. Transnational actors have the
following characteristics, they are based in one place,
present in several places, have a trained core of personnel, a significant communication system. That’s the World Bank,
that’s Phillips Petroleum, that’s IBM and that’s the Jesuits. So transnational actors
have a comparative advantage in moving ideas and resources across the boundaries of sovereign states. So he chooses these four problems, which I can only identify and not solve. First the environment. I would say that the
document on the environment it is best teaching document so far. The most sophisticated,
the most tightly woven. It combines normative and empirical data. It combines religious views and science. It joins the personal with the global. And it’s a distinctive way
in which he ties poverty and environmentalism together. The London Guardian, not
necessarily a contributor to Catholic social teaching
said the following, they said of this encyclical, “The most astonishing and perhaps “the most ambitious papal
document in the last 100 years.” Francis knows that on this
issue he’s got a unique pulpit, and he is committed to not waste it. If the overarching environment of our life is the environment, immigration is the fabric of
world politics increasingly. Not the only issue but part of the fabric. Immigration has become part of the central fabric of world politics. This Latin American
bishop is at work here. As John Paul II was a person of destiny, having lived in Poland and
addressing the world of his time, this son of an immigrant family, seeing the world from the
global south if you will brings a distinctive
view to this question. The third question is inequality. Immigration is an external
challenge to states and to our conception of
ourselves as a society, inequality is embedded in our societies, including the advanced
industrial democracies. After the financial crisis, and rooted in recent past
inequality has reached levels where is it a vibrant political issue. An issue that makes it harder
to deal with immigration. He tries to deal with
the two of them together. His final issue is nuclear weapons. These first three issues, the environment, inequality and immigration, are tied together by
social and economic bonds. He moves into a different arena, the arena of security and diplomacy. And here one has to again
think of the background. I have three more minutes
Shaun, and I’m yours. (all laugh) So Pius XII essentially was classical view of war and peace in the Catholic Church. He was a supporter of the just
war doctrine in principle. When he was challenged on that, his answer to it was to say no
catholic could be a pacifist. That is not said today, but
it was said in his time. His address to nuclear
weapons was fairly glancing, he did not enter into any of
the distinct kind of discussion that a man like Paul Ramsay entered into. And so that’s the first stage. John Paul II I think reflects Gaudium et spes on war and peace. On the one hand, a much stronger assertion of the need for the church to
be involved in peacemaking, and to be hesitant about the use of force. But he does argue, as Gaudium et spes did, that in a world which is an anarchic, no center of political authority, some use of force can be necessary
to preserve basic values. And Francis now has moved
onto his own ground. He has moved to some the
great beyond his predecessors. I think to some degree you have to distinguish two questions, what he says about nuclear weapons and what he says about war
and peace in principle. It is a question of nuclear
weapons that is clear I think. John Paul II was critical of what he called the insane arms race. And critical of the slowness
of arms control agreements, but he supported them. Francis to some degree is not only critical of the arms race, but he wants to go after a
concept that stands at the center of how states have dealt
with the nuclear age. And that’s deterrence. And so his critique of the arms race and his goal of zero nuclear weapons would not be all that different from some of his predecessors. But a critique of deterrence is different. Now, there are different ways
that you can approach this, you can have the goal of going to zero but not necessarily cancel out deterrence. John Francis himself says he is not speaking authoritatively here, and there is room for debate. But this is the fourth issue that he has combined with the other three. On all four you are at the
center of today’s world politics, and on all four Francis
has something to say. The question of how he says
it is for another lecture, because how he says some
things provoke response, and that’s partly when he
speaks I think as a prophet with prophetic discourse. The strength of that is evident. The limitations of it is
you can draw a criticism that you have to be ready to answer. And so in the Q&A I might be able to tell you more about that, but that is one piece of it, and I finished three
minutes late, thank you. (audience applauds) – Thank you Bryan for that, I’m sure we have hours of questions. But we’ll not be able to do that. Let me ask you one question and then we’ll quickly
pivot to the audience, and we’ll have microphones moving around, and when we get to that point just raise your hand and we’ll try to be generous in picking. So when we get to that point
please identify yourself and ask your question quickly, and the more we do that the more good answers
we’re gonna get here. I’m struck by you framing of looking at the international system
for all three popes, and if there is a common thread here each of them navigated these amazing pivots in the international system. And you asked the question how do IR people interpret religion. I’m curious if you can say something about how the popes were interpreting
the international system to reverse the polarity here. They seem to have had a finger on the pulse of the
changing political times that enabled them to respond nimbly. And I wonder, you can
pick any of the three, but what is it about each of them, or maybe you want to focus on Francis, what is it about his ability
to read the signs of the times and respond to the rise
of trans-nationalism for instance in the international system? – I would have to say that popes don’t explain themselves usually. That’s part of being pope. If you take Pacem in terris and think of the debate that had gone on on human rights for a century before, you start with Gregory XVI, they said what do you think
of the modern liberties? He said “They are utter nonsense.” (speaks in foreign language) he said they were. So you had this long debate between natural law and natural rights. You find it reflected in the literature, and then all of a sudden John XXIII just closes the issue with no footnotes That in a sense secular ideas of human rights can coexist with ours. Now, he knows they are not identical, but he solves it. So popes often don’t get
into their description of the international system, they get into threats and possibilities. But if you ask intellectually, I think there’s no
question that John Paul II had an articulated vision of that, Pius XII had an articulated vision, but it was basically against communism. And the vision of what
he hoped Europe would be. There is a book in preparation for this, I just came across a book
that only came out last year from a woman named Chamedes, who is an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin, I think in Milwaukee. It’s called “The
Twentieth-Century Crusade”. In which she traces the
Catholic responses to the 20th-century post world
War, the papal responses. And she has this theory that
it is built on multiplying and trying to get catholic teaching embodied in positive international law. It’s a book I like but I
wouldn’t necessarily agree with everything that’s in it. So they don’t get into that kind of thing. And people inside do, Casa Rowley could have sat in any seminar in any university in this country and clearly defended
himself on all of that. But the popes don’t declare
those kinds of things. So do they have a conception? I think yes. Do they have an articulated conception in the language of IR theory? Probably no. What do they get to the
point of an understanding from which policy then follows? I would say yes. – That’s very interesting. Again, I have hours of questions myself, but I’m gonna spare you that. So if you have a question
please raise your hand, and why don’t we go to
John in the back there. John, tell us who you are? – [John] I’m John Borelli, hi Bryan. Thank you very much, very provocative in many things you said. We could raise many
questions for dialogue. But I want to go back to the
first third of your lecture. Do you think Pius XII and his policies were hampered by the fact that he tried to be his
own Secretary of State? – Well I think even if he
had a Secretary of State he would not have paid a
lot of attention to him. So I think it was just easier. I think he was absolutely
convinced that he wanted to control things down to the last minute. So remember Nixon and Kissinger and poor Bill Rogers over
at the State Department. So Bill Rogers could have
taken long lunches every day and no one would have
known the difference, because that wasn’t where
policy was being made. And so Pius XII, he had obviously two very
talented assistant secretaries, Tardini and Montini, and he did use them, although one of the pieces
I did research for this said he depended on Tardini
and Montini up to a point. He had dinner with them once in 10 years. And so it wasn’t exactly
a working relationship. So this sense that he wanted to control the policy down through I think was so strong that it
wasn’t such an extraordinary gap not having a Secretary of State. People had all kinds of
complaints about how it ran and how the offices
functioned and all of that, but not of substantive nature that it would have changed
if he wasn’t there. – Question up here? – [Man] I teach part-time religion and international politics at Caltech. Getting back to this area I’ve recently read a book
about secret diplomacy, which focuses to an
extent on the relationship between Bishop Joseph
Hurley and Pope Pius XII. And are there particular Americans that you think have played a role in influencing these three popes? – There are any other Americans are you saying besides Hurley? – [Man] Yes, like let’s say
Cardinal O’Malley for example. – Yeah, he had Mensch in Germany as his ambassador to Germany. He had Hurley and Florida,
and there was a third. There were three Americans
that he appointed to diplomatic posts at that time. I was never quite clear how I think Hurley maintained being Bishop
of St. Augustine, Florida and ambassador at the same time. And I was never sure how well that worked. But it was part of this idea that he wanted to engage more Americans into the diplomatic
service and tie the bond. There was no question that he had doubts about Roosevelt’s
policies and a difference. But at a certain point I
think he just recognized he needed the United States,
primarily for reconstruction and in that sense, and so he was gonna tie that
knot as tightly as he could, that’s just my sense. – A question up here? – [John] Father John Hirsch, I teach in the English department here. How can you account, or how can we account for the extraordinary reaction that Pope Francis has occasion, extraordinary anti-Francis reaction that’s come about both internationally and also in the United States. The country of John Courtney Murray? – Well I think it’s a
multi dimensional question, some legitimate and some not legitimate I think so I think part of the reaction is people don’t like what they hear and feel like they just simply want to quite selective about how you
pay attention to the Vatican. Now remember, we’ve had this before. That is to say, we argued a long time around Vatican II that not every statement
out of a pope’s mouth was not only not infallible, it might be authoritative
but non-infallible, therefore open to critique. So there’s always room
for that kind of thing, and in resisting what I think
are illegitimate arguments, we don’t want to go back to a period where every time a pope
coughed everybody was to agree. That’s not gonna be helpful, it’s not gonna be. But some of this argument is just it’s not so much a reasoned
opposition to Francis, it’s just opposition without reason. And increasingly, its
opposition without reason and with a lot of money behind it. And so that is clearly not
a healthy kind of thing. It is one thing to agree
or disagree with the Pope, it’s another thing to run a movement that is self interested, funded by money, and is an attempt at a kind of takeover if I put it in extreme terms. Now, I think sometimes
Francis says things in a way that is prophetic discourse, and the prophets are never
known for syllogistic arguments. They do not want a reasoned
argument, they want conversion. And tomorrow preferably. So when you get into highly
complicated questions and you use the prophetic discourse, there’s a place for it
but it’s not everything. So I just gathered a range
of critiques on that basis. George Will, who makes an argument when
he wants to make an argument. The President of the United
States is finding that out now. But he can eviscerate you with 750 words. His comment on Francis, he’s only written one column on Francis, he’s written several on John
Paul II, very commendatory. But he’s written one column on Francis which was just before the Pope’s visit. And he said, “The Pope comes to the United
States embodying sanctity.” That was the way he started. He said, “He also has flowing
behind him sanctimoniousness”. And then he argued that
several of his physicians are demonstrably wrong and will hurt the people he says he represents. Now you can argue with that or not, but that’s a different kind of thing. One of my colleagues at
Harvard, Bob Stevins, S-T-E-V-I-N-S, Bob Stevins is an acknowledged expert on environment and climate. He wrote a column in which she
was complimentary to the Pope for taking this issue on. When the Pope gets to the question of carbon tax for example, and says this is not a
way to go, et cetera. Stevin’s says he’s got
the data against him, he said he is working against the best knowledge in the field. Well, you might argue about that, but Stevins is going to
bring an argument to bear. And then if you talk about
going to zero nuclear weapons, again as a goal, but the question is how
and how you get there. And so at least you have to deal with Tom Schelling’s question, not to Francis but to his friends, Henry Kissinger, George
Schultz, Bill Perry, Sam Nun. Schelling said to them who has told us the world is safer with no nuclear weapons than with a few nuclear weapons. Now, behind that is a whole argument about enforcement power et cetera, but it’s an argument, you
can’t shake Schelling off. So those things are
legitimate and necessary and I’m not saying the Pope shouldn’t use
prophetic discourse. I do say somebody else has got to be around to talk about it, otherwise you can easily get discredited with sweeping statements. Now some of his statements are
just highly vivid statements, and that’s different
than a factual mistake. But I think that’s part of
where the opposition comes from. And that’s different than the first thing. – We have a question in the third row, and then we’ll come to Jose next. – [Paige] Hi Father, I’m Paige Blocker, I’m an undergraduate. I’m going to ask you
an impossible question. – You’re gonna ask me what? – [Paige] An impossible question, given the kind of trajectory of the papacy over the past century, what would you say the next
pope is going to be like? If you can even guess? – Well as I mentioned in my speech the path to the papacy
is not easily determined. My guess is this, totally, this is like throwing a
dart at that board up there. So you first got a non-Italian,
then you got a non-European, it’s bound to be discussion
about two things. Where is the demographic
future of Catholicism, and that’s in the southern hemisphere. Where is the greatest
concentration of that, and that’s in Africa. And so my guess is, these things are never
determined uni-causally, but my guess is that an African pope would not surprise me at all. Now, he may be selected on
totally different reasons, not demography, not regionalism, it might be we need to, as you know, you have a papacy for 25 years, or 20 years with Pius XII, we want a transitional pope, they got one who was called John XXIII upended the church in a positive way. But my guess is an African pope would certainly not surprise me, and I think would have
a lot to support it. – Let’s come to Jose. We’ve got a microphone,
yeah, here it comes. – [Jose] One of the paradoxes
of our transnational moment is of course the kind of
coalitions that one finds, the attempt to develop a
transnational moral majority between the rational Orthodox
Church and the Putin regime. American evangelicals, the Catholic Right, certainly in Europe against
what they call is the federalism, secularism and general ideology
of the European Union, and of course linked to populist parties which are nativist and ignorant
and xenophobic and Islam. One could say that I had it not
been for this Pope, Francis, we would have today the Catholic Church much more involved in this coalition. So one of the fundamental
things he introduced, you said this Pope is not only a diplomat, but also brings something
internal to the church. And what Pope Francis brought is the kind of moratorium
and the moral confessionalism that engenders the key
confessional identity of Catholic Church and its policies. – I’m gonna ask some
help, I have hearing aids and in this kind of room I’m
missing a good deal of that. Tell me what the question was? – Well he’s not quite to the question. – [Jose] The question is had
it not been for this Pope the change in the centrality of questions of gender within the church. That today we would have a different church with
different coalitions, probably with American evangelicals and the rational Orthodox Church being linked in Europe against. I mean with populist parties
against the European Union. – The question is Francis
has been a mitigating effect to prevent the Catholic
Church from aligning with populist movements
globally, and I’m just curious. That’s a fair summary? – I think, as I mentioned in this speech, one of the things that I was fascinated by as I thought about John Paul II is, he’s a perfect person to talk about a legitimate patriotism
over against the other side, because it seems to me
that these are ideas, particularly patriotism we
always thought of as a virtue, (speaks in foreign language) there is too much and too little, but nationalism can be the same thing. So my sense is, there’s some wisdom there. I think secondly, I guess
what I wanted to say, but it was very telegraphed, was that if you take
immigration and inequality, in between those you get
this witches brew sometimes of people feeling that inequality levels have affected them in such a way, that they are then resistant
to any immigration at all, even though that might have nothing to do with it whatsoever. So I do think that there is a way in which I would take the environment, immigration and inequality arguments and in a more expanded way think about the relationship
among those three, each one has its own inner logic, but looking at the relationship. Now, question about building
a coalition against that. It’s partly a church task and
it’s partly a secular task. If the inequality argument it is what it seems to be
in this country I think that there are sectors of the country that feel that they have
no no understanding why their real wages haven’t increased over the last 20 years. That’s an honest to God problem that is a public policy problem. It can get mixed up with other things, but it needs to be
answered on its own ground. I apologize I just didn’t get it all. – I don’t see any hands at the moment. Okay I will not intercede, we do have a hand here. – [Daniel] Good evening
Father, my name is Daniel, I am a graduate student in the program. I had a question specifically
about Pope Francis and his goal to address those four transnational issues
that you brought up. I was wondering as the
international system does go through this shift and as our current administration, and potentially in the future, if the US withdraws from
an international community where a lot of the norms
of the Catholic Church have perhaps been institutionalized, and that’s a form of
power in and of itself. I was wondering what you
consider Pope Francis’ strongest leverage of power
is to use to address these really difficult transnational issues? – Well, I think his fact of choosing them, they are not the only issues
that he could have chosen, but the fact of choosing them is wise. Every one of those is real, is addressable if you will. And you have to build coalitions
on any one to address. I think interestingly enough, I think Francis has handled the President of the
United States very well. He just doesn’t take the bait, he just doesn’t take the bait. I think he thinks there’s
no real possibility of making progress with this president. And therefore is not gonna
talk a lot about that. I think he did it with
one sweeping statement, and that is, “We ought
not to be building walls, “we ought to be building bridges.” That’s enough, that’s enough because to get into a shooting
match with President Trump is just not worth the time and effort. The payoff is almost non-existent, and the quality of the
debate would quite honestly, if you did take the bait would lower the prestige of the papacy. So I think he just realizes there are limited possibilities here. He can spend his time with Angela Merkel, now the Europeans have their own problems, but the fact is there’s more room there then there is right now
at the United States. So I’m not trying to tell you how to vote, I’m just trying to tell you that I think this Pope is smart enough not to get into that kind of catfight with no outcome that is useful. – We have a question in the back? – [Woman] You talk about the importance of human rights for John Paul II, and I was just like you
to talk a little bit about the pushback on liberation
theology that happened? – Well one man in front of you could discourse on this forever. There are a lot of people around here, I’m not talking about secularization, with the man in the front row here. So I’m ducking these things. But obviously it seems to me the story was an evolving story. So he went to Pueblo he went to Pueblo before
he went to Poland, now Pueblo was set ahead
of time, but he went. In a sense he could have ducked that to get his feet on the
ground, but he went. And it seemed to me the
strategy he used in Pueblo was he felt there were things
he needed to criticize. But he also felt he needed
to have an independent policy about social justice which he stressed in a major kind of way his own version. That started to discussion. Now obviously it was seen as a criticism of liberation theology, but there was positive
content to that speech, both doctrinally and in terms of human rights and social justice. The next step of the two
letters of the eighties, the first one being quite critical. The second it seemed to me, always what the second letter
from the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith did in my view was to incorporate large
sectors of liberation theology into the ongoing social
teaching of the church. So it wasn’t so much the
liberation theology issue, it was where liberation theology has been and how it relates to the
larger social teaching. Then you had the Brazilian
bishops who came to him and said, “Let us tell you about how
this fits in our setting.” And he then wrote the Brazilian
bishops a letter and said, “I understand what you’re saying.” Now of course when you get to this papacy all of that to some degree is history, because nobody less than Cardinal Muller, who hasn’t been all that
positive at times about the Pope, has said the Pope is influenced
by liberation theology and Muller thought that was a good thing, it was part of the pastoral
life of the church. So I think with John Paul
II it was an evolving story. I think that chapter is
not the definitive chapter, this chapter might not be either, but eventually schools of thought coexist with other aspects of Catholic teaching. – So we have time for one more question. So let’s go to Marianne here. – [Marianne] Hi Bryan. – Hi. – [Marianne] Thank you. Nuclear arms control
and disarmament treaties are falling apart as we speak. The guardrails are really
off on the nuclear arms race, and Pope Francis is going to Japan to make a major statement
on nuclear weapons. How do you see what ways
could he be effective in trying to stop the
development of a new arms race, or draw greater attention to this issue. What do you think are his openings at a time when the US and Russia seem to be going in a different direction? – Well, I think we’re
at a dangerous moment, we’re at a really dangerous moment. And therefore that’s why
my approach to these things is you have to take steps, and you have to concentrate on different steps at different times. You can have an ultimate goal, I think we used to call
that the final cause, the last in execution,
the first in intention. But in between you gotta have efficient causes
that get things done. So I think the visit to Japan, he will take advantage of that. I thought John Paul II’s
visit to Japan was remarkable. He had this wonderful phrase, he said, “To remember the past is to
commit oneself to the future, “to commit oneself to the future “is to commit yourself to choices “that can see the past
never happens again.” So the present situation we are in, remember from the US side that the launching of
$1 trillion proposal for the whole redoing of the nuclear arsenal, that story started under Obama. That was a original commitment under Obama that Trump has now either
simply gone forward with or I think expanded. Secondly, a part that I didn’t get into the talk when you start talking about the shape of the
international system today. Obviously one of the things that I think, we talked about transnationality, transnationality is there,
it’s going to be there. You can talk about multi-polarity, there is multi-polarity today
in the international system. But we now have what
Walter Russell Mead called the return of great power politics. You’ve got a rising China
and a resurgent Russia. And so we haven’t thought about that kind of thing for a long time. We happily got out of the custom of thinking that the world was
simply bipolar and nuclear. We now have a situation
where all of the other things that have been there in the post-Cold War, an increasing multi-polarity, increasing role for transnationality. Arguments about multiple rising powers, but it now looks like we’re headed into a tripolar kind of relationship
at the top of this. And the dangerous part,
as you know Marianne, is that the fabric of even the fragile arms control treaties that we have are being unraveled. So the IMF is gone, there’s no talk about renewing new start. And that puts even more pressure on the non-proliferation treaty, which to my mind is absolutely necessary, but always was morally flawed. It was a morally flawed
treaty from the beginning, had to be, because the idea of the treaty was we don’t want any more. Well that’s okay if
you’re the one saying that and you possess them, but it doesn’t work for most of the world that have
signed up to this treaty. So things are unraveling here, my guess is, my guess is that we’re gonna have to concentrate on how we take the view of
the international system that has developed over the last roughly 30 to 40 years. That’s not gonna go away. But over it we have to put this cupola of this rising big power treaty. And the question there is to some degree to go back to those bilateral,
now trilateral negotiations, because you can’t get all of this done, as important as the UN is, you can’t get it done in that framework. People just aren’t willing to
put their cards on the table. So there are things to be done
there on non-proliferation. But in my view, we’re gonna have to think
about big power politics along with a more fluid multipolar
system that is there. – We’ve run out of time. It’s been a remarkable speech, and fascinating discussion which we can continue
into the reception area. Please join me in thinking
Bryan for this remarkable. (audience applauds)