thank you very much I mean but always says it's a great pleasure to be here but for me it really is for for lost lots of reasons last but not least I have not been coming to Hungary that much and this was an opportunity to to be here and and see the beautiful city a lot of parts of it are really really beautiful and I have an emotional relationship with all that but I do have a relationship emotional relations of a CEU too because I taught here in 1994 when I'm not even sure what the factory or the or the plant was that that you shared a lot with but you know the thing was very different than now except that the students then is now we're quite quite wonderful in particular I can say that my class now I find one of the best classes not because of me but because of the the work and participation of a problem the majority of even a small class who are really free astonishing in terms of the kinds of things they say and the kinds of criticisms or questions that he has address to me so it's been really a great pleasure and of course in this time as dr. Ignatieff knows I would like to give whatever small support I can to the institution which should have been a part of you know should have been Hungary's pride at least one of the institutions that the country should really be proud of and and I don't really understand you know I I write about the battles at Constitutional Court's and with the press I could really understand that or even Hungarian universities I can kind of understand why the logic of the existing arrangement targets it but I don't see I can't really understand why this place is targeted I don't even understand why George Soros's targeted given his past you know recently I read distil Iqbal that was the Phyllis a statement early in around 1990 and there's an interview with him and he says yeah III support Fidesz that was shirisha's perspective back then of course the situation was different he was different Fitness was different but there is really a long-standing relationship I don't quite understand why it went the way it did but this is of course not my topic and I can't really contribute unfortunately very much to do the future of this really quite wonderful institution but I really hope hope for the best but of course the topic I speak about it's not entirely irrelevant or irrelevant to it I call the presentation three phases of populism movement government and and regime I wrote because someone asked me to write a review of ernesto la Klaus populist reason so I I did I did that and although I think Zoltan is right thank you very much those are for inviting me by the way I should be thanking you specifically for arranging this Zoltan is right so I look back at earlier writings including the ones on civil society populism has come up as a theme as a problem but I wasn't writing on populism as such until I had a chance to write on la Klaus very interesting work with which I disagreed with of course but which I was also impressed by I think since that time of course I began to read the literature and my wife who's in New York and I even are planning a book but then we looked at the literature if she's which is quite frightening at this point I mean their volumes collective volumes 3 4 5 6 there are at least 3 handbooks on populism they're individual country studies as an enormous amount that is being written and a lot of it by very high level people so it's not as if you know not as if it would be easy to enter a field in a discussion like that but I'm still doing it although I'm not entirely sure if if a book will come out of all this and if it did and today's presentation would be certainly a chapter because I think one thing that I do is is a little different than what others do namely I want to to address different ways that populist politics presents itself as the title says movement government and regime are are the three forms and it is it is my thesis that how one talks about this subject of the three phases of phases helps orient one in in some of the debates around populism one of them is the debate about its relationship to democracy and the other one is is the debater but it's about the definition of the phenomenon let me talk about those two and then present what I think of these three phases and then end with the relationship of each of those phases to the democracy authoritarianism problem so as far as populism and democracy you can in the literature is very broad and an extensive literature you can certainly see every possibility on the one end for an Islamic Lao let's say that's one end of the discussion it is a democratic phenomenon as such since representative democracy liberal democracy make democratic claims falsely populist and populist politics is really involved in in the realization of popular sovereignty which is which cannot be said in his view about about institutionalized forms forms of of democracy and then of course there's the other end where a variety of authors Gino Germany who was on to produce a really big book on this subject focusing on on comparison of fascism and Argentine populism who thought the phenomenon whatever its side-effects whatever its unintended consequences is it's always authoritarian he did this in the basis of a really one case but there are a lot of people who now support him a basis of lots of cases and arguments are made which some of which I will refer to in a few few seconds but what is also striking is how many people present the phenomenon as both democratic and authoritarian or as hybrid or having democratic and austerity and dimensions and and I think it's impossible ultimately to neglect those who try to make those arguments both empirically but both theoretically empirically but mostly mostly empirically so there is there are these these perspectives and of course it would be natural that the perspective could be based either on empirical comparison or on on logical considerations I can't obviously I'm not going to address populism empirically in terms of the very large number of countries where the phenomenon is set to set to exist but logical considerations of course are linked to definitions and if indeed you define populism as the process of the self creation of a popular subject you will see populism si se as a fundamentally democratic phenomenon if on the other hand you define it as as based on unperson ilysm mobilization from above friend enemy relations or manichaean relations among among opponents within the political system then pretty clear that that the the outcome will be will be problematic from the point of view of democracy I was impressed by la claw you hard to find an author who really supports not just a phenomenon but also who personally advises populist leaders in his case there Kirchner's in Argentina who for methodological reasons is nevertheless totally honest in presenting a definition of a phenomenon I will focus on him for a second because I think that that this is the definition which we really need now it is based four or five / steps one step result I mentioned it's in popular sovereignty certainly populism is an interpretation of popular sovereignty in La Crosse since the only the only proper and legitimate interpretation but he presents it also and again he makes a virtue of something which almost everyone would criticize as a chain of equivalences among the heterogeneous set of demands which then other people can show leads to wrath to the sin or even no ideology at all reliance on rhetoric rather than persuasion he thinks these are indeed virtues because they help the emergence of the subject whose nature in his presentation partakes have a part whole dialectic I mean this is this is something that that already 1843 Marx criticized the Third Estate pretending that it is the French nation or a Sur or the French people although he did think that the proletariat could become the representative of the whole well to look how it is again a virtue that one sector of the population could could stand for the whole in some kind of persuasive and and politically politically convinced sense one of the reasons that he thinks it can argument derive from Carl Schmitt because strong friend many relations are established with another segment of the population and it is animosity to that segment which unites the the foe in the inner Schmidt in argument that unites the friend the friend unit interestingly I had a little debate with John Vernon Miller about this scent and other people there people who agree with him agree with me Locke agrees with me that such a unification is not possible without one single person being the center of that of the unity empirically one can show in a few seconds I'll give some examples of popular strands which kept which do not have a single a single leader but in fact there very few like that and in general populism involves single person leadership whether it is charismatic or not we don't have to we don't have to decide since obviously you can see how there can be huge difference between let us say even in a single country between Chavez and Maduro Maduro maybe being overthrown today so it's kind of interesting that's that's respeaking girl history continues no one ever said he was charismatic and in services case everybody can see that he certainly is our friend here at least when he was a young and handsome man was charismatic whether he is now well I leave that opportunity to decide who actually are spending spending time there was no question that he he had something when he was when he was young so charisma might be here or there but single person leadership is always part is always part of the phenomenon well once you use this definition this complex four five part definition to which Locke law even as the constituent power about which I will say something but obviously grabbing constriction power doesn't characterize every single populism so I would not want to make it part of a definition with this definition we we are in position to to look at the three phases it's pretty obvious what the first phase is movement right populist stuff populist movement I was just reading an article by Tish today preparing for tomorrow's class and we're going to be dealing with with the constituent power in under populist conditions and he wrote a piece an introduction to volume edited by by taught constitution for a disunited nation was English title and their kiss I didn't remember spoke about a populist backlash as the background of of the turn that occurred in 2000 I didn't remember that but it is certainly in that case a reference to movement type phenomena I mean obviously you cannot really say and and I think he even says this in some other article that that Fidesz was a populist party before it came to power but as a lot of estranged from the beginning there was a populist opinion a populist backlash which which grew as as time has gone and and and this was certainly certainly a phenomena from below it had leaders within some parties but the opinion was generated on a basis of horizontal horizontal relations we should be surprised I mean we spoke in 1989 you know I actually since 1981 about the reconstruction of civil society in this whole region and some people when they looked at our book said well you are neglecting right-wing movements you're only speaking about the positive ones well yes because we were speaking about a strategy of democratization and it was those movements that we preferred that were supposed to play the major role but clearly from the outset there were different kinds of initiatives if you I don't know how many people I've read island torrents solidarity which is actually a very good and interesting book I still I still teach it he point out point even in the case of of the of the master movement which others hoped but or very few could imitate solidarity there very indeed different different dimensions different aspirations different ideologies some of which pointed and direction of Esther and mr. Toren group put it a reconstruction of a civil society you know in Eastern Europe's I can talk about this the Caucasian rural solidarity was the deeds of the of the working class movement even student organizations they would have to organize but on the other side they were also Integris movements fundamentalist dimensions that were they were not interested in in plurality or pluralism and wanted to transform poland according to ideological project which in retrospect we can call populist I don't think it was called populist populist back back then so so civil society the reconstruction of it implies of course pluralism pretty much this is this was everybody's view but pluralism of course allows the possibility of a variety of movements initiatives initiatives to form and and many of these movements some of these movements will be populist from the outset others will be parts of other movements the famous to sidedness of movements that Turan has has studied which has meant that under some conditions what was originally a movement in and for civil society could become really something else David O spook I throw around too many books because we read different things but David Oh spoke on solidarity the first and the second indicate this transformation of a of a at least a two sided movement I'm not sure if that was his position to one that becomes becomes fundamentally sending many respects authoritarian how that happens I think we can talk about I I was not going to talk about the causes of the populist resurgence but in the discussion if you want and in a class we do discuss that all the time I could I could I could address that what I think is interesting right now in this three phases argument is that populist movements in one respect are different than other movements ever anywhere where they can they form political parties of course one could show then lots of countries they don't obviously United States which has had a populist party in very early part of its development where it was made possible by federalism the fact that you had as in India very often now you had two party system state-by-state which would allow some two-party systems in usually in this case in the in the West and Midwest one of the parties could become a populist party with some chance even in first-past-the-post systems but generally I think we can say that the formation of a populist party is going to be much more likely in places where proportional representation or some other scheme like the ballot dodge at least creates some premium for new party formations but in those places where that is possible we certainly see populism populist movements generate political parties it's not a small matter in every new social movement the question of should we become a party is raised I remember that discussion in the Greens there was a very serious matter in the German greens but it should we become a political party and what happens to the movement if we become a political party does the movement lose its ability to articulate a wide variety of of projects interests norms once it has to make coalitions once it has to make deals with other parties no point in being a party if an electoral system if you cannot come to power so it as always it was always a debate and I'm sure if if if I were an empirical student of European populism which I'm not I I in a way I told my class I don't even know Spanish but I've always wind up looking at the latin-american cases because my students in New York work on them if I were a student of the European cases then perhaps it would be possible to say why party formation occurs in some places and not others beyond the electoral rule but there is a very general tendency in that direction and I would say that that has to do with the fact that as populism was defined by me just now the idea of representing as particular particular set of views in a pluralistic field is not very attractive to do to populist politicians if they believe that if they believe and very famous statement by a Hungarian Prime Minister indicates that belief has on Hamlet Ln Sigma the nation cannot be in opposition well if you cannot be in opposition well then functioning in a pluralistic field cannot express cannot express the aspirations that you identify as the nation's as a whole the nation can be represented only only for comes to power and populist movements as far as I know everywhere raised the everywhere attached to electoral scenarios not only do they form political parties but in fact they hope to realize the goals of political party through through winning elections there are exceptions the first classical form that of Peron represented coming to power through a military coup and only I mean it's an amazing coincidence probably I'm sure it is because the man was a fascist sympathizer but the hunter gave him the job of becoming Ministry of Labour how this happened no one knows but this is historically very significant right because he uses the Ministry for labor to create a movement or at least address a movement because it was already happening I want to go into the details of it but because of demographic and and economic change in Argentina the foundation for a movement and activity on the grassroots level already existed but Tehran was put in position to to organize it and he didn't do it after having come to power through elections but what does he do he's not exceptional ultimately because once he confronts his colleagues in ohonta he uses the movement and then moves toward elections and had I think two fair elections before he began to fully manipulate them that logic is part of part of my story in any case coming to power populist movement everywhere matters misses Lipan is not there just trying to create a new identity for for one set of social actors she's interested in coming to power and and this I think even in cases where the movements are weaker can always be shown to be part part of the aspiration now there are people to be fair who distinguish between populism is a movement and and populism as a government but to be fair to myself my distinction is a three-part one as you can see from the title populism in government means you want an election and I think I want to make it more specific you gain control of the executive you can see why from the definition it follows that interest is in the executive because if you want to represent the unity of the nation against whoever has been declared or resident who has ever been who's been found as the enemy legislature is not the best vehicle since the legislature there is already plurality there is an opposition in the legislature you can of course have a legislature and try to deal with it but there has to be someone ultimately this comes from a tradition of kingship there has to be someone who who can speak ultimately beyond all those are physicians who is the nation's elect mark stock will probably many others already discussed this in the battles between between Napoleon or Louie Napoleon and his legislature one is the nation's elect the others are elected by either parties or constituencies representing plurality the executive can represent represent unity so so so a populist government means you elected an executive that's or populism in government means you have elected an executive figure I know in a parliamentary system I know already I can see already on several of your faces that how does this supposed to work in a parliamentary system well ask yourself how the Hungarian Prime Minister makes it work because in fact there are parliamentary systems where somehow a diversity leadership does emerge in spite of the fact there is apparent apparent plurality but I think numerically if he wanted to do a quantitative study a large and study you're going to find many more populist populist in government in presidential systems and in need some populist prime ministers Indira Gandhi in in the during the emergency of the 70s or at least Rajiv Gandhi wanted to convert India into a presidential Republic you have certainly seen air dogon having done it just now in Turkey most Latin American countries don't have program in Parliament or some to begin with so it's not a not a problem and I always thought but now I think this is over that even the Hungarian Minister would not mind would not have minded a presidential turn where he could run run for the presidency but in any case some in some parliamentary systems the model is managed they the interesting one would be Poland in this sense where there is a leader but the leader is does not play does not himself directly occupy the position of the executive well of course empirically with my definition are gonna be all the same different different difficulties estimate ideal types but I mean the theoretical point I'm trying to make and I have to watch my time because it's my students know you know I go on endlessly it's terrible when you get old you talk more and more and more and you you know how do you watch yourself how do you you know stave it in a normal limit and this and leave time for all the interesting things that an audience like this people are gonna be say so I'm working on it but you know at the battle is not yet won in in any case what happens when a populist leader well is in government when the executive is controlled by such a figure who ideally would like to to be able to speak in the name of the nation as a whole who does create friend enemy relations in society who does think that a part of society is the whole who may even be interested in the constituent power and so on well of course the United States we see this is happening we do have such an executive and and certainly everybody knows because it's in in every every newspaper in every every television program that this means that this means battles galore between well of course already if it's the executives and battles between the executive and the courts exactly when Congress eventually as you know people rightly say the press is is in a way a fourth branch of government very close to playing governmental role in in at least liberal democracies the battles of the press when an executive in is in power and who imagines that your soy in Venezuela I am Venezuela that statements like this in in in in in in in most of the cases I don't want to say all that the nation cannot be in opposition would be the version diversion here then of course these battles are pre programs because the other branches also think that the nation speaks to have multiple set of voices that's what separation of powers means right everyone all the branches are expressions as 19th century French theory would put it our expressions of the popular will that cannot be embodied in any single one of them the populist idea however is that it is embodied and generally it's embodied an executive I'm as far as I know no Supreme Court president ever claimed that he can speak for the nation as a whole legislatures perhaps with large majorities have a tendency in that direction but any case that claim in itself means battles against against the other branches and as long as it's only a question of populism in government those battles are sometimes fun and sometimes lost I mean you know in Hungary I don't want to give an analysis on Goering situation because I really for a long time have not been close student of it so you all know it much better but I think many of you feel at least or will feel that in Hungary these battles were fought and and and won certainly in the United States they have been fought but not won I mean you can read the New York Times Washington Post and probably 20 of the newspapers in United States every day and there's a constant battle going on with with the executive and of course now that the Democratic Party has captured the House of Representatives the battle is ongoing and then the courts how many decisions go against against the executive even as he has packed the Supreme Court and there is a kind of feeling on the part of judges that they'll eventually lose when it goes all the way up there no one knows quite for sure and in any case almost every week there is a new decision which then is denounced denounced by by the president one response to this is to retain the movement persona I'm sure that somebody here has thought that my distinction is artificial because even when in government they act as a movement I saw this first in Turkey when there – since 2002 the okapi has been basically in power but it is constantly fighting against other institutions which have remained in place and of course it's not the legislature which they also control it was a prime ministerial setting until recently so they fight against what the deep state right that's the term he's becoming a term of art I don't know if anyone here knows when it was first articulated first used but I first heard it in Turkey and in Turkey the obvious reason for it because in in the Turkish case certainly the military the judicial structure public administration were strongholds that the camel is still lead for a very long time and you could say that's the deep state we have the government that should be controlling the state but there's a deep state that actually controls the state and it's trying to destroy us complexities of this later on Turkey and Arliss and don't interest us but the movement persona is maintained because even though interesting the hustla cannot be I'm sorry I'm mixing Hungarian English the nation cannot be in opposition well even when in government it still remains a movement fighting fighting the enemies but now the enemies are not not political parties as much as structures of the state it's amazing the United States if you have participated in the history of the American left not too many people have but if you know something about it you know that leftists have always thought that the police and even more FBI and CIA are the enemies of everything good I must say I never quite thought that I always thought that a country in the world like ours Rick has to have these kinds of institutions but of course those have a history of remember McCarthyism and in the role of these institutions then the fact that that the president is constantly fighting with these institutions is very striking and and surprising and unsurprisingly perhaps the term deep state began to be used also by the alt-right the the most radical defenders of the position of the presidency so so remaining a movement is a way of dealing with the issue of power and it's required in a way because independent of the opposition of the deep state or independent of the opposition of of remaining political parties populist government I have not gone into all aspects of this but it following from the definition I gave following Locke law has quite a lot of difficulties in carrying out its programmatic goals in a way if you try to appeal simultaneously to a variety of demands a very variety of social groups if you create a multi class movement satisfying all of them simultaneously becomes difficult of course in some settings if you happen to have an enormous amount of oil resource as in the Andes at a certain period you can do this fairly successfully perhaps more important oil was more important and then ten charisma to make a vulgar Marxist point of some kind I'm sure that they were both both significant but but in order to carry out policies of the type for example President Trump has promised which implies in a one side a kind of restoration of industries that have already been severely reduced by the international division of labor and international competition if you simultaneously promise to restore the dignity of a certain segment of population that has serious severe identity problems the white male of the south when already when the country's cultural development is quite in quite different direction not to speak of his demographic development then of course failure is kind of built in to to the structure yes of course Chavez seems successful but then suddenly the failure turns out to be as we might even see today to be to be dramatic and one response to it is to me to claim they're not in power which is why we still have to fight the deep state or someone else but there's another response and that takes me to the third leg of my argument which is which is populism as a regime now what do we mean I mean regime government are so often used as interchangeable and daily press that that it's difficult to really use these terms without without some attempted definition government is the center of political power that makes explicit decisions within the overall structural and institutional framework and regime refers ultimately to the structural and institutional frameworks within which governments operate and have have limits only we naturally think of liberal democracy even it has different forms as a kind of as a kind of regime and it remains the Liberal Democratic regime whether a Conservative government or a social democratic government or a liberal government is elected the rules the fundamental rules remain ultimately the same within a single regime type when people spoke and that it was a useful very good term in in countries like Hungary about regime change they didn't just mean we're gonna replace the previous incumbents by a new set of incumbents they meant that we're going to replace one set of rules by a completely different set of rules forget now with the continuities and and and and similarities and even reappearance of previous things later on buses certainly if if there's a military coup and there's a military hunter that rules a country for for 73 to to the end early 80's in its in Chile one kind of regime was replaced by another now the methodological problem is and this brings because to my own area of work is that that regime and Constitution could easily be identified as the same as as the same same object what I want to maintain though is that there's a serious relationship between them but but not an identity and for reasons for those of us who study constitutional politics and so we know that their constitutions which are just pure form and the actual regime will have everybody from Central Europe Eastern Europe knows this the actual regime will have quite other rules not and it's not entirely rule less but you cannot read the Constitution in 1936 and actually find out what the rules of of political interaction we're in the Soviet Union at the time so so there can be a complete divergence between regime and Constitution generally and this is some extent what we call Constitution some no there is no full do full virgins and many other things constitutions describe actually do have regime constitutive elements but even in those cases there is common law development and then and this is not just an anglo-saxon matter that that the conventions of the constitution customs even laws which have a cause the constitutional role emerged and helped to change the material constitution reality calcine Sturm was this the material constitution that material constitution is not identical to to the written written constitution but in liberal democracies anyway the written constitution plays a significant role that's what we mean by constitutionalism to some extent namely the constitution not only is represented a set of norms but is a sets of norms to which there is at least a relatively hearin sand and since the second world war especially since 1990 we kind of think that there are even institutions whose job it is to to produce that kind of that kind of relationship so constitution to some extent is the regime constructive or the regime constitutive dimension of the of the of the legal legal order and the interest of of populace in the constitution is is it's quite a striking phenomenon and I would say it has to do with with the regime question and not just the governmental governmental question now first of all why is it even so striking that they should be interested I mean after all after 1989 everybody seems to be interested and even before of the countries of the United Nations maybe three do not have a formal written constitution so everybody has a constitution but you know we have seen that already I said that the Soviets have societies those constitutions do not play a role as elsewhere and they cannot be really treated as constitutions in a full normative normative sense what is interesting in the populous cases though and I think even you know Hungarian basic law indicates this is that the constitutions that are produced are not just paper constitutions of the old type and that they are they are meant to be the significant extent the rules of of regime a regime construction and and and in in this sense then the fact that in spite of their battles with Constitutional Court's populist movements do establish when they can and and dream about establishing when they cannot as in the Polish case for example barely speak about it a third or fourth Republic that the poles speak about as the desirable outcome of the current governments of faith doesn't matter that interest is is always there I think even if we not going to interpret it as interesting constitutionalism I think we should notice that that it expresses an interest and I think that expresses an interest in the regime regime dimension and and and why should they be even interested in regime dimension once they have governmental power it's another step in the argument concerning weakness on a level of policymaking disappointing followers creating new antagonisms and you are positions even among previous followers popular to be a populist in government is in a way is in a way risky business and the possibility which has not been realized in too many cases Indira Gandhi is is one of the few of using elections in a way that actually will lose executive power is on the horizon and we could talk about if you're interested a lot of literature stresses this and that it's almost definitional for populism to to continue relatively relatively free competitive elections but in any case the chances of losing are there under the old regime under the old Constitution so the task becomes making sure I thought for a long time and I think many of you here think the same that for example in Hungary the experience of government between 1998 and 2002 was formative for the leadership around the now Prime Minister how to make sure that this can never happen again I think is the is the basic is the basic lesson to be drawn from from the Huzur having to go into Opposition in the nation having to go into opposition and this can only be dealt with on the regime level that is if we continue just to be the government and we're gonna have free elections I think you know if you read my first piece on the constitutional development here which was written there are 2013 I guess 2012 published in a in the volume I already mentioned I was optimistic about the 2014 election could have happened and I tend to think that perhaps even later there was there was some chance but but that chance I think we all see is being reduced on the institutional level and that's because of attempts to create to create a regime which perhaps has institutions that resemble institutional liberal democracy but which function differently so what does it mean well it means to transform the separation of powers it means even to change the electoral rule it means to to weaken the courts a very very important part of it it's not just to fight with the press but to eliminate the possibility of free press some of these things can be put into constitutions some of these things become part of the practice but then they are part of the material constitution people have stressed I have several conversations with with violence mother or a lot of people stress the corruption I can't say anything about it I just don't know really the facts beyond but some people right but but you really do notice the problem of corruption and clientelism becoming worse and worse in almost any populist populist government and in the end a corrupt system becomes the basis of of political of political interactions and competition in the sense that that the voters are directly influenced by client allistic relations there are in the hands of individuals who are who are who are corrupted and this too is an important instrument for continuing to stay in power you see it you see it everywhere who the who are who the groups are who are singled out as the ones who have to be taken care of will change from country to country Venezuela for example three clear that there was enormous attention paid to making sure that the military is is well supplied supported and the top officers will continue to support the new regime irrespective of of what happens well as I said I'm policing myself and and and what I want to end with since I'm basically a relatively optimistic person that's against most of my Hungarian friends who tend to be dark and pessimistic about their present and their future but I guess living in the United States changes you in this respect and so I I always I always look for for the possibility of of change in situations of which I'm critical if I want to end with that but I want to indicate just briefly that these three stages of populist politics even in their very nature have different relations to democracy one of the reasons I promised that I will explain why people feel some people argued that populism is Democratic forum and other people argue that it's also returned from the outset I think that that way of seeing things becomes possible and understandable because the different phases have a different relationship to democracy when populism is a movement for example I mean obviously it banks on what in every representative democracy I would say it's not just European Union phenomenon is a democratic deficit I remember even before this current epoch several people would write about democracy it's an unfinished project I just read today in a piece of Kish that I was reading of course no democracy is complete every democracy requires democratization that's just not a thing for the poor Easterners every democracy has gap between represented and representative pierrots our Lord Rosa melena wrote an interesting book about how existing democracies compensate in such settings and how difficulties can arise in that form of compensation so I think on the level of a social movement even populist can actually focus on a democratic lag and and you see this in European populations now because many of them speak about the democracy deficit now sometimes they put this in sovereigntist and nationalist terms but still that's what they're talking about right when they say the technocracy in Brussels is making decisions they are unaccountable it's only on the highest level of the executives that that their decisions can be any questioned and we ourselves the Danes had such a vibrant democracy here and now we are losing control over democratic decision this is of course something that was especially said aggressively during the recent crisis but I think democracy deficit from this point of view is visible for those who are willing to see it and the population of course are and in pointing to it they indeed can be even allies of new social movements which are in fact argue in the same in the same way so to the extent that there is a democratic side as against for example the older law latin-american model when it was a question of including people who are excluded from the world of citizenship if there is a democratic side today it has to do with the movements criticizing the democracy the Marxist deficit but when of course in power whether in a level of governmental regime the very same movement activists if they get governmental responsibility instead of speaking about democracy deficits are increasing the gap between the represented and the representative and then this this of course does lead to an increasingly authoritarian logic because the represented feel treated I mean they thought that a populist regime is going to mediate between them and the state or them in government and they find that the new regime is just as far injustice hostile justice remote possibly much more so because mediations in society have been reduced mediations like independent parties or the press or even civil society organizations so the different stages of populism different phases I should not say stages and in the discussion I'll tell you why be a mistake to talk about stages empirically the different phases of populism have different relationship with democracy and this then does lead to different chances for for opposition's I mean when on the level of of social movements even a right-wing movement even a right-wing movement finds itself to have some common issues with left-wing movements you can see and very good friends of mine in the Hungarian case even timur ties this that i in some conditions you could even be allied you know who I'm talking about right issue of your big which in a purely electoral technical sense it's almost inevitable that in some settings there will be alliances but what about a level of public discourse and and yeah if there were you'll be government and Hungary I think very few people who who are interested in in feminism or ecology or or even working-class politics would feel the need to be in some dialogic situation or a potential situation of common action with such a populist information but on a level of movements it it could happen and there are cases certainly start Lee occasionally and and it's kind of surprising even political parties are are capable and Italian case indicates but they are both populist formations interestingly enough and many of their enemies are common when when it is a movement it it can be in some respect part of a democratic field and and populist movements can play a democratizing democratizing role even if one rightly recognizes and in you know in Hungarian case polish case was recognized early that there's a very authoritarian trend within those movements so one collaborates and fears at the same time on the level of government struggling against against a populist executive and this will be quite different according to context of course we'll take take a different form it will not be a question of a of a dialogue or occasional cooperation and then hostility it will rather take the form of trying to organize a powerful coalition mostly on a level of parties but a level of also civil organizations and and and hear the danger of course is that the political means for that the press public discussions sometimes even independent existence are in the hands of governments people who participate against the government you know you you you come you combat politically a populist movement well you can get beat up on the streets which which is possible in lots of countries but once the government once there is governmental power the state bureaucracy is given instructions by government people lose jobs people lose their security newspapers disappear and and so the task becomes much much much more difficult there certainly a temptation at this point for example chantal move has articulated this that that kind of populism which is really either in governmental power or very close to achieving it can only be opposed by a counter populism it would be very suspicious of that view but I can understand why the kind of weakness that that activists would have would would lead would lead lead to that that conception obviously as long as populism zoning government you're still going to have relatively free elections so whether it looks like plausible in Hungary now or not the main strategy against populism in government is to beat them in an election the next election I mentioned Indira Gandhi it can happen she had a lot of political resources indeed people wearing camps during the emergency and yet she suffered the crushing defeat in an election that she called herself so obviously populism and governments we even as one is skeptical about new electoral rules about having no access to media having no political resources to fight elections elections are always an opportunity and on some level lost elections they can be due to all these structural things but they also are due to the what's being a shock in English the between the two languages I lose sometimes yours on one side the other side a pair of paralysis on the side of the opposition right you know elections are lost because of what they are doing but also what we're not doing and and I think in every setting that kind of paralysis is an important factor but by the time you get the populism as a regime of which perhaps Russia today is a pure form then I think the idea of defeating them in an election becomes pretty remote I mean certainly auto-return systems that have no elections that obviously that point is out so you could not have defeated Mussolini's Italy in an election I think he had referenda but I'm sure that they control the results anyhow so certainly regimes the electoral thing is structurally missing other regimes like here before 1988 there are elections but but in fact the elections are such that that it is not a tool for any political out come work or change populism is interesting I'll end with this because even as a regime elections I mentioned Putin as the developed case of a populist regime perhaps Maduro Venezuela could be another there are people who would say this about Hungary but I I think I would be hesitant in saying in calling this a consolidated regime of a new type but in any case in these cases the question is whether elections are now have become pure so or they are so controlled that they cannot represent a method of change and in Russia I think that would be a plausible hypothesis so if there's a temptation on there populism in government to form a counter populism then of course is a temptation under under populist regimes to become a revolutionary I don't remember how many of you here well I know I know several of you from the 80s and and I think several of us were saying we're not revolutionaries right remember missioning wrote lots of pieces on this structural reform radical reform in Spain they made a a nice term combining Ruth Torah and reformer Abdullah reformer Paquita da was an additional term sometimes added to it Spain was first in terms of these negotiated transitions I think that perhaps we would be back there since we were right to reject a revolutionary attack on existing systems in which power is taken violently or by force and which we we treat the other side as enemies who must be simply destroyed I mean that's what the revolutionary logic is you know you kind of ask the question if if valiant mother is right about this description of the Hungarian state and I leave it up to you whether he's right into what extent and what extent he's he is wrong at the very least one would say there are huge accumulations of of money that have emerged within the client holistic system so what should be done with those who have enriched themselves in Russia or in Hungary or in Turkey which is a very large number of people but it's of course some ultimate ly small minorities well revolutionaries have no problem in that but what happens if we actually try to deal with that issue directly i I think that somebody said to me the other day then the old begins again and I think that's what we should be avoiding even in the face of populism in the form of a regime okay thank you very much [Applause]